Security Council Resolution 816 (Klemenčič, 2009 ) was authorised and a no-fly zone over the country was implemented a month later. Subsequent to this, Security Council Resolutions 819 and 824 authorised safe area in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Žepa, Goradže, Tuzla and Bihać. However, the lack of clarity regarding the way these safe areas were to be protected was exploited by the Serbs. The result was genocide at Srebrenica, which set in motion a chain of events leading to a forthright NATO response against Bosnian Serb positions in September 1995.
The Dayton Peace Agreement, which formally ended the Bosnian war, was a direct consequence of NATO action alongside a joint Croat-Bosniak offensive, actions which substantially changed the situation on the ground. Under the agreement, the Bosnian State -Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) -was to comprise two entities: The Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FBiH) formed from the Muslim-Croat alliance forged during the war, and the Serb controlled Republika Srpska (RS). Upon conclusion of the accord, NATO immediately set up an Implementation Force (IFOR), a one-year peacekeeping mission, mandated to oversee the military annexes of the General Framework Agreement 1 . IFOR also effectively relieved the UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR), which had been present in the country since 1992 (Silber & Little, 1997) . In April 2010, NATO agreed to grant a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Bosnia, which is the penultimate step in a process that leads to full NATO membership. The MAP is a "NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance." 2 However, before
Bosnia can begin the process, it is a NATO requirement that all military property in the country be registered with the Bosnian state (Šolaya, 2010) . By 2011, one third of sites considered usable for military purposes were ready for state ownership. However, there have been complications with the remaining sites as "a number of buildings from the list of 69 sites visited are outdated and require significant investment to put them in order". 3 Only once this has been completed, can Bosnia join the MAP programme. The integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) within NATO and within the European Union is considered of paramount importance for the future of the country (Beaumont, 2009 ) and the wider stability of the Western Balkans (see Radeva, 2010 , Attila Hoare, 2010 .
These developments, however, create a degree of tension in the region. Those living in RS, who are ethnically and culturally linked to Serbia, for the most part, look to Russia as their traditional ally, and because NATO is the principal military tool of the West, proxy Cold War political dynamics rekindle longstanding political alliances and psychological allegiances. There is also continuing resentment among Serbs over NATO's military action that brought an end to the Bosnian war and to their intervention in Kosovo four years later. Although the Cold War ended in 1991 and the Bosnian war in 1995, the past continues to resonate through the generations. Furthermore, to add to the political and psychological complexity of the situation, Serbia now openly seeks membership of the European Union, which moves political and economic interests in the region westwards. For many living in Republika Srpska, the continual shift towards and away from western institutions may well create a dissonant psychological state. This is the point at which social memory, political beliefs and identity converge to create a complex, shifting and, at times, a competing sense of political reality for many in the region. While political stability is the objective of all parties, views on NATO in BiH are highly polarised. Since 2006, the State building that characterised the immediate post-war period has come to a halt. In 2008, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown, and Dayton negotiator Richard
Holbrooke called for concerted international action, describing the country as "sleepwalk(ing) into another crisis" and in "real danger of collapse" (Ashdown & Holbrooke, 2008) . Such action has not been forthcoming and, since the inconclusive general election in October 2010, there has been a marked deterioration in political stability (Azinović, Bassuener & Weber, 2011 
Rationale
While there is recognition of the need for rapprochement with Serbia within FBiH (Roberts, Becirevic & Paul, 2011) , little is known about the representations of NATO among those living in RS.
Therefore, this exploratory study seeks to explore attitudes to NATO within Republica Srpska (RS), which includes an evaluation of prospective BiH NATO membership. Understanding the underlying structure of these representations within RS (estimated population >3million) would provide an indication of the current state of political cohesion and the likelihood of achieving consensus in the region.
Method

Social representations of NATO
Historically, academic interest in NATO has largely been concerned with three broad issues, USSoviet/Russian relationships during and following the Cold War (e.g. Forsberg, 2005) Kovács (2005) examined public opinion in Hungary on NATO membership over the same period. This type of attitudinal research can provide a foundation for gauging public opinion. Whatever method is selected, the objective at the initial stage is to accumulate relevant foundational knowledge, which means that the study is often exploratory rather than inferential, i.e. it seeks to identify areas worthy of more detailed investigation at some later date. In this respect, given the size and nature of the sample (N = 950), this study provides a substantial foundational analysis from which to proceed.
Design and sample
The attempt to survey a representative sample in either Bosnian entity faces particular challenges not encountered in other European populations. At the time of the study Bosnia was the only country in the region, following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, not to have conducted a census (Azinović, Bassuener & Weber, 2011 Notwithstanding these obstacles, a telephone survey was carried out in RS, and to counter the absence of a viable electoral roll, a random sample of telephone subscribers was obtained from the most recently available directory. This methodology has two advantages: (i) there is no need to employ (geographical) cluster sampling and (ii) potential respondents from remote areas can also be included (Groves et al, 2001 , Nicolaas, 2004 households." Therefore, while we accept that estimates derived from a telephone sample will be subject to bias, this should not be appreciably higher than existing data sets. Initially, a target set of 1,000 subscribers was produced by means of a table of random numbers generated by the random number function in SPSS16. The numbers were based on the size of the RS telephone directory and the number of subscribers listed on each page. In the process of generating the numbers no duplicates were permitted. In the event of non-response, interviewers were instructed to move to the next available number in the list. This systematic protocol eventually produced a sample of 950 respondents.
Questionnaire items
The questionnaire contained a variety of demographic measures (age last birthday, gender, ethnicity, employment status, annual income, highest level of education) and political party membership. Age was coded into six distinct groups; [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] previous studies by Hanze (2001) and Atanasović (2007) utilised single item measures to assess attitudes to NATO, which is standard practice in Western research on foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Zeigler, 1987) , this study employed a more comprehensive inventory of items. This has the advantage of reducing measurement error (Ansolabehere, Rodden & Snyder, 2006) and is more suited to revealing the structure of stable underlying preferences. It also allows us to understand and predict socio-economic and cultural correlates of any particular stance taken towards NATO as well as locating its source or origin.
Quantitative measures
A number of items addressed respondents' views about the consequences of NATO membership in the domains of security, economics, international relations and international reputation. (strongly agree to strongly disagree) was counterbalanced.
Qualitative measures
To supplement the quantitative data, there were several open-ended questions on the questionnaire.
These addressed general impressions of NATO, sources of information that have influenced impressions of NATO, the positive or negative rationale for NATO membership for Bosnia (FBiH) , and the quality of political leadership within the state.
Procedure
Six students from different universities in Republika Srpska conducted telephone interviews during September and October 2011. At the beginning of this project, the Atlantic Initiative provided intensive training in research methods and methodology and the students had the opportunity to practice telephone interviewing. During the period of fieldwork, interviewers received continuous supervision by the Atlantic Initiative. Data from the interviews were subsequently coded and entered into SPSS.
The responses from open-ended questions were entered as string variables for subsequent thematic analysis. In addition to the survey, and to assist in its validation (see Carpini & Keeter, 1993 ) a series of focus groups were held in Bijeljina, Milici, Prijedor, Banja Luka and Trebinje. The focus groups addressed some of the same questions found in the survey and additional questions concerning the perception of NATO and, in particular, images and associations prompted by NATO as an organisation.
Analysis
Quantitative: All analyses were conducted through SPSS (v16).
1.
Frequency counts of the responses to closed questions were generated
2.
Because of the number of response alternatives (Streiner & Norman, 1989 ), Cronbach's α was used as a measure of internal consistency for items on the NATO scale. This was compared with principal components analysis of the same items.
3.
On condition of meeting a satisfactory criterion (α ≥ 0.70; Nunnally, 1978) , the concurrent, discriminant and predictive validity of the scale was explored through correlational methods, the t-test and general linear model.
4.
Should the scale exhibit satisfactory properties, analysis will be undertaken to determine predictors of favourable representations of NATO. This analysis will comprise both general linear modelling and use of artificial neural networks (Multilayer Perceptron Analysis).
Results
Sample characteristics
A majority of the survey respondents were male (n = 596, 63.1% cf. n = 348 female, 36.9%). The mean age of the sample was 41.08 years (SD = 17.31) with a range from 18 to 84 years. The ethnic composition of the sample was similar to that reported in 1996 in the UNHCR census (Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics, 2009) and comprises Serbs as the largest group (n = 895, 94.7%), followed by Bosniaks (n = 27, 2.9%) and Croats (n = 4, 0.4%). Other categories of ethnic identification were given as Mixed (n = 9, 0.9%), National Minority (n = 1, 0.1%) and Other (n = 9, 1% 
Item analysis
Tables.1a and 1b below present the frequencies by which the principal questionnaire items were endorsed. These are also shown broken down by ethnicity.
Insert Tables 1a and 1b
The cf. non-Serbs 44%) consider themselves well informed about international politics and large majorities of both Serbs (63.8%) and non-Serbs (86%) consider it either 'important' or 'very important' that all people in Bosnia reach a common understanding of the recent past.
Attitudes to NATO: Scale construction
The first twelve of these statements were assessed for their ability to form a composite scale measuring overall attitude toward NATO. The internal consistency of these was high ( Figure. 1, which is a good approximation to a normal distribution (M = 29.3, SD = 9.64).
Insert Figure 1
Scale validity
Content validity
We would argue that this criterion is easily met as the scale items pertain to a broad range of aspects and possible consequences of NATO membership i.e. the scale items are representative of the wide range of circumstances in which specific attitudes are generated (Streiner & Norman, 1989) .
Discriminant validity
Examination of the validity of the scale was conducted first of all by examining the correlates of the attitudinal scale and its ability to discriminate between different groups.
Variation in Attitudes to NATO by demographic variables
Analysis of the data suggested differences in scale scores by a number of variables; gender, age, ethnicity and level of education. These differences are described below.
Gender
Females had significantly more favourable attitudes to NATO than males (30.87 cf. 28.47; t (895) 3.6, p < .005).
Age
A general linear model showed significant differences in attitudes to NATO by age (F(5, 885) = 3.72, p = .002) with significantly more favourable attitudes present in older respondents (65 years of age and older). See Figure. 2 below.
Insert Figure 2
Scheffe's post hoc test showed that NATO scale scores were significantly or marginally significantly higher in this age group compared to 18-24 year olds (p = .068), 35-44 year olds (p = .065), 45-54 year olds (p = .018) and 55-64 year olds (p = .017). Though higher, scores from those above 65 were not significantly different to those from 25-34 year olds (p = .15).
Ethnicity
Serb respondents were found to hold a significantly more negative attitude to NATO (28.74 cf. 40.77) compared to Non-Serbs (t (895) = 8.39, p < .0005) (see Figure 3 ).
Insert Figure 3
Level of education A general linear model showed no significant differences in attitudes to NATO by level of education (F(4, 883) = 1.75, p = .14). However the most favourable attitudes were evident amongst the least educated (Primary; 31.02, SD = 9.42) followed by the most educated (University; 30.39, SD = 9.68).
Those with primary education had scores that were marginally significantly higher (F(1,886) = 3.26, p = 0.07) than all other groups.
Variation in responses to NATO by other political views
Analysis of the items assessing other political views and attitudes yielded a variety of significant relationships with NATO scale scores. These measures included degree of trust in politicians,
understanding the role and purpose of NATO, being well informed about politics in RS and being well-informed about international politics, degree of importance people attached to the people of
Bosnia reaching a common understanding of the events of the recent past. Details of these relationships are outlined below and provide substantial further evidence of the scale's validity.
Degree of trust in politicians
Low levels of trust are related to more favourable attitudes (r = 0.15, p < .0005, n = 900).
Understanding the role and purpose of NATO
This was inversely related to NATO attitude (r = -0.24, p < .0005) with those reporting greater understanding having a less favourable attitude.
Being well informed about politics in RS (r = -0.23, p < .0005, n = 900) and being well informed about international politics (r = -0.06, p = .056, n = 899) negatively correlated with a favourable NATO attitude.
Degree of importance people attached to the people of BiH reaching a common understanding of the events of the recent past
Greater importance correlated with a more favourable attitude (r = 0.32, p < .0005, n = 882).
A general linear model yielded no significant interactions between gender, ethnicity and age (gender 
Construct validity
As indicated earlier a single item measure in which participants were asked to give their view of NATO (from negative to positive) on a four-point scale was included in the survey. This provides a means for assessing construct/concurrent validity. Validation of the 12 item scale was supported by high significant correlation with the single item measure (r = 0.71, p < .0005, n = 897). Recoding of the single item into a binary variable (positive v not positive) enabled the single item measure to be compared with the scaled variable for its sensitivity and specificity to detect a positive or negative attitude to NATO. Of those designated as having a positive attitude by the scale score only 53% were correctly identified by the single item (sensitivity = 0.53) whilst 98% of those designated as having a negative attitude (specificity = 0.98) were correctly identified. As the scale was constructed from items pertaining to the Bosnian state and the Serbian entity within it, a further test of construct validity comes from correlating the scale with the item which is addressed to its principal neighbouring state, i.e. whether "Serbia would benefit from becoming a member of the NATO alliance". As predicted, there was a high correlation between these items (r = 0.81, n = 898, p < .0005).
Modelling responses
A main effects general linear model using the variables identified above was able to predict 25.7% of the variance in attitude to NATO (F (13, 836) below). Ethnicity and importance attached to reaching a common understanding of the past were again the most important explanatory variables -the weightings attached to these explained 62% of the variability in the explained R-Square, though overall the weightings given to these did not differ significantly (t (109) = .85, p = .40).
Insert Figures 4 and 5
In addition to modelling NATO attitudinal variance by linear regression, we also looked for a criterion of demarcation between those who are favourable to NATO from those who are not. To model NATO scores in terms of binary outcomes entails the use of logistic regression. Given the marked ethnic differences in the frequencies endorsing the various statements, it was decided to conduct the logistic regression analysis for Serbs and Non-Serbs separately. The analyses are described below.
Predictors of favourable responses to NATO membership amongst Serbs
A distinct minority of Serbs (n = 171, 18%) exhibited a favourable attitude to NATO), the question then is what distinguishes those who are favourable from those who are not? The same variables used to model the overall NATO scores (with the exception of ethnicity) were used to model favourability to NATO scores. A hierarchical logistic regression was used with age group, gender and education entered in the first step (all as categorical variables). In step two, degree of trust in politicians, understanding the role and purpose of NATO, being well informed about politics in RS, being wellinformed about international politics, and degree of importance people attached to the people of Bosnia reaching a common understanding of the recent past were entered. In a final step, the item "Serbia would benefit from becoming a member of the NATO alliance" was added. Results are shown in Table. 2.
Insert Table 2a
The 
Predicting favourable responses to NATO amongst Non-Serbs
Among Non-Serbs, a majority had favourable attitudes to NATO (n = 31/44 = 70.45%). Following Peduzzi et al's (1996) guidelines for calculating sample sizes for logistic regression, a model with eight predictors would require a sample size of 10 x 8 / (1 -0.7045), which is equal to 270. Even the less stringent criterion suggested by Kleinbaum, Kupper and Mullet (1988) , whereby the number of covariates are multiplied by 10, would necessitate a sample size almost double the number of nonSerbs in the present study. Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2006) , however, acknowledge that it may be permissible for logistic models to violate this rule of thumb without undue problems when it is necessary to control for confounding variables, and when the ratio of cases to variables is between five and ten. Consequently, we elected to construct a five variable model for non-Serbs; gender and age are included as controls (entered in step one), with the remaining three variables (those suggested by the model with Serb participants; understanding the role and purpose of NATO, attitude to the recent past and whether Serbia would benefit from NATO membership) entered subsequently. This compromise should avoid the risk of over fitting the data -a potential risk of logistic models with low sample sizes -while giving an indication of the predictive capacity of the model among non-Serbs.
Results of this hierarchical logistic regression are presented below in Table 2b .
Insert Table 2b
This model also fitted the data well χ 2 (9) = 22.01, p < .0005; Hosmer & Lemeshow χ 2 (8) = 5.99, p = .65) and explained between 41.5% (Cox & Snell) and 60.4% (Nagelkerke) of the variance. It correctly classified 80.5% of the non-Serb participants as pro/anti NATO. Whether Serbia would benefit from becoming a member of the NATO alliance was the only variable to approach statistical significance (p = .08). However, given the vastly lower power in this sub-sample compared to the first means that the absence of significance must be treated with caution. For example, while importance to understanding the past was a highly significant predictor of NATO favourability when modelled among Serbs, and was not significant in the analysis of non-Serbs, it should be noted that the raw correlation between this item and the dichotomous variable of NATO favourability was identical (0.23) in both Serb and Non-Serb populations. Thus, it is the overall effect size that should concern us more than significance per se. In the case of the variable relating to understanding the role and purpose of NATO, however, the situation is different. The raw correlations with NATO favourability (-0.15 in the Serbian sample and + 0.15 amongst the non-Serbs) do suggest that the relationship between the predictor and NATO favourability may be different across ethnic lines, i.e. that greater reported understanding of NATO among Serbs is related to a less favourable attitude, while among non-Serbs, the opposite is the case.
Taken together, these analyses suggest, first of all, that whether one is favourable to NATO can be predicted reasonably well in both the Serb and Non-Serb population. Secondly, a strong predictor amongst both Serbs and non-Serbs is the degree to which Serbia would be considered to benefit from becoming a member of the NATO alliance. Finally, although the lower power available in the analysis of non-Serbs must be treated with caution, the analyses raise the interesting possibility that the predictors operating within each group may do so differently. To understand these possible differences, further analysis of the meanings attributed to NATO and how these may be related to the construction of the past, was required. This data was obtained from the focus groups held across the region.
NATO and political attitudes to the past: Focus groups and survey data
What is evident from the data is that the public view of NATO is ethnically polarised. This is likely In addition to the negative emotions towards NATO stemming from past NATO intervention in Bosnia (1995) and Serbia (1999) , recent NATO intervention in Libya was frequently mentioned as a basis for unfavourable views towards NATO. Furthermore, a number of focus group participants expressed scepticism of the values that NATO promotes, such as democracy and human rights.
To me NATO is one big organisation for destroying the world's regimes. When they do not like a regime somewhere they destroy it. They destroyed Libya and it was such a rich country.
Overall, the focus groups provided an enriched understanding of the divided representations of NATO. This was illustrated in an exercise in which participants were asked to rate the extent to which they associate words such as peace, security, defence, freedom, human rights, democracy, effectiveness and modernity with NATO. Approximately half of the participants associated security and modernity with NATO, and some associated peace with NATO because of its role in bringing an end to the war in Bosnia, but no other words were linked to NATO.
In the final analysis, we modelled (via hierarchic logistic regression) the importance attached to past understanding (some/none) in terms of (step one) ethnicity (Serb/NonSerb), (step two) whether The other major factor underlying a favourable response to NATO membership and involvement in the region concerns an approach towards mutual understanding of the recent past. The data indicate that the imagined political future is closely tied to "the importance attached to agreeing a common narrative of the recent past". The more that respondents agree that Serbia would benefit from joining the NATO alliance, the more importance they attach to the people of BiH coming to a common understanding of the 1992-1995 war. Reaching a common understanding of the past is an important objective and the dynamics of social memory may need to be monitored, even engineered by mutual agreement for the education of future generations. But even though political elites may choose to "sell" a positive image of NATO to people in the region, which might increase the prospect of reconciliation in Bosnia, these developments may not be welcomed in Russia. Opinion polls in Russia continue to show relatively negative views (see Forsberg, 2005 for an extended discussion of Russia's relationship with NATO). Indeed, Russia has continually expressed objections to NATO expansion into Eastern Europe (see Rühle, 2014) and we must bear in mind that the desire to forge political and economic links with the EU was a precipitating factor in the current conflict in the Ukraine.
Future research, nonetheless, needs to address the sizeable minority support for NATO membership among the Serb population of RS. How may this be explained or understood? Are there additional social and/or political factors that characterise this group that have yet to be identified?
There also needs to be more focus on the sources that inform the views of people in the region. Which are the most trusted and why? We can only surmise the future effects of the current conflict in the Ukraine on political attitudes and affiliations in BiH. Recent events, however, provide a clear warning that political elites and decision makers need to understand nuanced beliefs existing within specific groups if they are to manage the dynamics of political consent and explore the possibilities for political change, which is desirable for all parties within the Bosnian state. 
